SUSPENSION OF THE RIVERS STATE GOVERNOR BY THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

By Aisha Mohammed Agashi

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, in his address to the nation on March 18, 2025, declared a state of emergency in Rivers State. According to him, this decision was taken in line with the provisions of Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which governs the procedure for the proclamation of a state of emergency.

In addition to the declaration of the state of emergency, the President also suspended the Governor of Rivers State, the Deputy Governor, and the members of the Rivers State House of Assembly for six months and appointed Vice Admiral Ibokette Ibas (rtd) as the new Administrator of Rivers State.

Section 305 of the Constitution vests the President with the power to declare a state of emergency, either at the request of the Governor or suo motu. However, the section stipulates strict conditions and procedural safeguards that must be followed to ensure that such extraordinary measures do not infringe on democratic governance and fundamental human rights.

The effect of a declaration of a state of emergency is that it empowers the President to adopt extraordinary measures to restore law and order when such is broken down or threatened. This aligns with Section 45(3) of the 1999 Constitution, which defines a state of emergency as a period during which the President is empowered to adopt extraordinary measures as conferred upon him under Section 305. However, neither Section 305 nor any other provision of the Constitution empowers the President to suspend an elected Governor.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Governor of Ekiti State & Ors v. Prince Sanmi Olubunmo & Ors (2017), unanimously held that a Governor lacks the power to dissolve democratically elected Local Government Councils. This decision resonant with the fact that the President of the country cannot suspend or remove an elected Governor or the State Legislature.

For the avoidance of doubt, Section 11(4) of the Constitution explicitly states that even when the National Assembly takes over the legislative functions of a State due to the inability of the State House of Assembly to perform its functions, such a takeover shall be without removing the Governor and Deputy Governor from office.

By virtue of Section 305(4), a state of emergency can be declared upon the request of the Governor. When granted, either by this request or by the President acting suo motu, the Governor has the constitutional role of working with the Federal Government to maintain law and order, among other duties. This provision makes it clear that even when a state of emergency is declared in a State, the Governor remains a party to its administration. Hence, the suspension of a Governor by the President is unconstitutional and ultra vires.

Section 188 of the Constitution sets out the conditions under which a Governor’s office can be declared vacant, whether temporarily or permanently. These include circumstances such as incapacity and other grounds stipulated under the section. It cannot, however, be argued that the phrase “extraordinary measures” mentioned in Section 305(3)(c & d) gives the President the power to suspend an elected Governor. This is because the Constitution clearly provides in Section 188 the specific conditions under which a Governor’s office may be declared vacant.

It is a well-established principle in law that “the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another” (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). By explicitly stating the conditions for the removal of a Governor under Section 188, the Constitution excludes any other method of suspension.

Regardless of the political tensions in Rivers State, the suspension of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and the State House of Assembly is unconstitutional, as the 1999 Constitution neither provides for nor suggests the suspension of an elected Governor. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Constitution that allows the President to remove an elected official, including a sitting Governor.

While the situation in Rivers State may be politically volatile, it fails to meet the constitutional threshold for the removal of an elected official, including the Governor, Deputy Governor, and the State Assembly. The President’s action amounts to a clear abuse of power, as he lacks the constitutional authority to remove an elected Governor under a state of emergency. Any such action constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment on democratic governance and the autonomy of State Governments.

Conclusion

It is incorrect to suggest that Section 305 empowers the President to remove an elected Governor, as the section only provides the President with the power to declare a state of emergency and take extraordinary measures to restore law and order in a State or the entire Federation.

To argue that Section 305 allows the President to suspend an elected Governor would be to suggest that if a state of emergency were declared in the entire Federation, the President would also be removed/suspend from office; clearly an absurd and unconstitutional interpretation. Thus, the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and Members of the Rivers State House of Assembly for six months is unconstitutional.

REFERENCES:

• The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
• Governor of Ekiti State & Ors v. Prince Sanmi Olubunmo & Ors (2017) LPELR-42163(SC).
• Mazi Afam Osigwe, SAN: President, Nigerian Bar Association – “State of Emergency in Rivers: ‘Suspension’ or Otherwise Summary Removal of a Democratically Elected Governor and Other Elected Officials is Unconstitutional” (Available on businessday.ng. Accessed on March 20, 2025).
• Daily Trust – “Tinubu’s Suspension of Fubara Can Be Overturned – Yadudu” (Available on dailytrust.com. Accessed on March 20, 2025).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Aisha Mohammed Agashi is a recent law graduate of Bayaro University, Kano m, with interest in writing, legal research, politics among others. She has been actively involved in various academic and leadership roles, contributing to discussions on governance, law, and policy. Aisha is particularly interested in constitutional law, human rights, and the intersection of law and public affairs. She enjoys exploring legal issues through writing and research, aiming to contribute to informed discourse on contemporary legal and political matters.

To reach her, Email: aishaibnmohammed@gmail.com or visit her LinkedIn profile at: http://linkedin.com/in/aisha-mohammed-agashi-