A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Position on Processes Signed by Law Firms: Okafor v. Nweke and Olowe v. Aluko

By: Habeeb Olayinka Lawal, ESQ

Introduction-The question of who is competent to sign court processes goes to the very foundation of legal practice and the integrity of judicial proceedings. It is not a mere procedural nicety; rather, it implicates the statutory authority to practice law and, by extension, the validity of proceedings initiated before the courts. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has had occasion to pronounce on this issue more than once. Two of its decisions, Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 and Olowe v. Aluko (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2003) 517, provide an interesting, and perhaps conflicting, narrative on the subject.

This essay reviews the facts, reasoning, and conclusions in both cases and interrogates whether Olowe v. Aluko reflects continuity with, or a departure from, the position in Okafor v. Nweke.

The Statutory Framework

At the heart of the debate lies the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (LPA). The Act establishes who may practice law in Nigeria and, by necessary implication, who may competently sign court processes. The relevant provisions of the Act, as also considered in the two cases, are sections 2(1) and 24.

Section 2(1) provides that:  “Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the Roll.”

Section 24 defines a “legal practitioner” as: “a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor either generally or for the purpose of any particular office or proceedings.”

Two points are clear from these provisions:

1. Only natural persons whose names are duly entered in the Roll maintained by the Registrar of the Supreme Court can practice law in Nigeria; and
2. Law firms have no personality under the Act to act or practice as barristers and solicitors.

The evident mischief the statute seeks to prevent, as confirmed in the cases under review, is the unauthorized practice of law by unqualified persons. The judicial challenge has been determining whether processes signed in a firm’s name, though composed of qualified practitioners, meet or fall short of the Act’s requirements.

The Decision in Okafor v. Nweke

The relevant facts in Okafor v. Nweke is that the appellants filed a motion on notice at the Supreme Court on 19 December 2005 seeking an extension of time to apply for leave to cross-appeal and other consequential reliefs. The motion, the notice of appeal and the brief of argument were all signed in the name of “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co.”, a law firm.

The core issue was whether processes signed in the name of a law firm, and not by an individual legal practitioner, were competent.

The Supreme Court, per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was), adopted a strict textual interpretation of the LPA, holding that:

1. Only natural persons whose names are on the Roll qualify as legal practitioners.
2. A law firm is not a person recognized by the LPA, and therefore has no legal capacity to sign processes.
3. The signature of “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co.” was not that of a legal practitioner thus cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the courts.

The Court thus concluded: “it is very clear that by looking at the documents, the signature which learned senior advocate claims to be his really belongs to J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. or was appended on its behalf since it was signed on top of that name. Since both counsel agree that J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO is not a legal practitioner recognized by the law, it follows that the said J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. cannot legally sign and/or file any process in the courts and as such the motion on notice filed on 19th, December 2005, notice of cross appeal and applicants brief of argument in support of the said motion all signed and issued by the firm known and called J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. are incompetent in law particularly as the said firm of J.H.C. OKOLO SAN & CO. is not a registered legal practitioner.” Page 531, paras G-H

The Court’s approach was strict, textual and formalistic. The decision elevated professional discipline and statutory fidelity above considerations of substance, treating the defect as incurable.

The Decision in Olowe v. Aluko

In Olowe v. Aluko, though the writ of summons at the trial court was signed by “Akin Olujimi, Esq.”, the accompanying statement of claim subsequently filed was signed in the name of the law firm “Akeredolu & Olujimi.”

At the Supreme Court, the competence and validity of the statement of claim was challenged for the first time having being signed in the name of a firm of legal practitioners rather than an individual legal practitioner.

The issue therefore was whether a statement of claim signed by “Akeredolu & Olujimi”, a law firm comprising identifiable Senior Advocates, was incompetent by reason of not being signed in the personal name of an individual practitioner.

The Supreme Court, per Idris, J.S.C., in resolving the issue, appears to depart from the position in Okafor v. Nweke. His Lordship reasoned that both Chief Akin Olujimi, SAN and Chief Rotimi Akeredolu, SAN, were indisputably legal practitioners duly enrolled to practice law in Nigeria. The Court observed that:

1. The names “Akeredolu” and “Olujimi” were not fictitious but directly traceable to identifiable persons on the Roll.
2. There was no ambiguity or uncertainty as to the professional standing of those whose names appeared on the process.
3. The requirement of the LPA was satisfied once the names on the process could be identified as belonging to duly qualified legal practitioners.

The Court held in a clear term: “Once a name appearing on a legal process is identifiable as that of a person duly enrolled as a legal practitioner in Nigeria, the requirements of the Legal Practitioners Act are deemed to have been complied with and such process is valid in the eyes of the law.” Pages 559-560, paras H-A.

The Court thus validated the process, taking a purposive and pragmatic view of the LPA.

Reconciling the Two Decisions

The apparent conflict between Okafor and Olowe lies in their interpretive approach to the same provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA).

In Okafor, the Supreme Court construed sections 2(1) and 24 LPA with rigid literalism. The Court reasoned that only a person whose name is on the Roll can sign court processes. A law firm, not being a person whose name appears on the Roll, is not a “legal practitioner” within the statutory definition. Thus, “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co.” was treated as not qualified to sign court processes, notwithstanding that the name “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN” was directly traceable to a Senior Advocate of Nigeria on the Roll. The presence of the suffix “& Co.” proved fatal because it displaced the signature from an identifiable person to a firm, which the statute does not recognize as competent.

Conversely, in Olowe, the Court took a purposive view of the very same statutory provisions. It held that the statement of claim signed by “Akeredolu & Olujimi” was valid because the names could be traced, without ambiguity, to Chief Rotimi Akeredolu, SAN and Chief Akin Olujimi, SAN, both persons enrolled under the Act. The Court emphasized identifiability over technical form, reasoning that the object of the LPA is to prevent unqualified persons from signing processes, not to nullify those traceable to qualified practitioners.

If identifiability is the operative test, then logically, “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN & Co.” should have been treated as valid in Okafor, since “J.H.C. Okolo, SAN” is undoubtedly a legal practitioner on the Roll. The addition of “& Co.” should not, in principle, have altered the analysis.

Two readings are, therefore, possible:

1. The case of Olowe represents a departure from the rigid literalism of Okafor, moving towards a more purposive interpretation that privileges substance over form.
2. Alternatively, the Court in Olowe has refined the principle in Okafor. Thus, the test is no longer the mere appearance of a firm name, but whether the names on the process are clearly traceable to duly enrolled practitioners without ambiguity.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on processes signed by law firms reveals a disquieting ambivalence. On one hand, Okafor v. Nweke remains the locus classicus for the proposition that only persons whose names are on the Rolls of legal practitioners and not law firm can sign court processes, and any deviation is fatal. On the other hand, Olowe v. Aluko has introduced a pragmatic test of identifiability, suggesting that where the names are directly traceable to practitioners on the Roll, the process will be upheld notwithstanding its firm style.

The consequence is uncertainty for legal practitioners. While Olowe represents a progressive shift towards a more just and purposive approach, Okafor has not been expressly overruled. Until the Supreme Court definitively reconciles these divergent positions, it remains prudent for counsel to execute court processes strictly in their personal names to avoid needless objections.

The lingering question is whether Olowe was intended as a deliberate jurisprudential shift or whether it inadvertently diluted the Okafor precedent. Whichever is the case, clarity from the apex court is urgently needed. The law abhors uncertainty, and legal practice thrives only on predictability.

About the Author: Habeeb Olayinka Lawal is a legal practitioner and Accredited Mediator with practical experience in litigation, corporate advisory and dispute resolution. His research and publications focus on intellectual property, Islamic finance, dispute resolution and emerging areas of law. He can be reached via 08169894541 or olayinkalawah@gmail.com